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BOOK REVIEWS
The Bells of Helmus was published in 1934, which 
means no adult reading it at the time would be alive 
today. Nonetheless, you don’t need to be clairvoyant 
to know that Cobie de Lespinasse’s story of her own 
hometown’s past went over in Orange City like, well, 
flatulence in church, as they say. 
It’s a strange book really, all about faith, or the 
lack of it, or the spirit of it, or the simply hideous re-
sults of it when carried along by mean-spirited folks 
far more conscious of the mote in your eye than the 
log-jam in their own. Ms. de Lespinasse (Les pin’ 
awes, or something like that) is the granddaughter-
in-law of a unique character in a brand new Dutch-
American colony the author calls “Helmus.” Be ye 
not deceived; she’s talking about 1875 Orange City, 
Iowa, the citadel of Dutch Reformed-ism in the new-
ly homesteaded northwestern corner of this state, the 
town in which she herself was born and reared. 
Frederick Manfred’s “hometown” novels—he 
called them “rumes”—consistently called Orange 
City “Jerusalem,” and with good reason. Orange City 
was, at least until the Second World War, the county 
seat (once righteous Dutch burghers strong-armed 
the county records from Calliope/Hawarden, where 
the gangsters who ran the region kept it under lock 
and key…or tried). Inasmuch as Orange City was 
the seat of political power in the region, it was also 
home to many of the region’s brightest lights, as well 
as the uppity folks, frontier doctors and lawyers and 
judges, not to mention the academics who gathered 
there once the town had reared its own Academy, a 
true institution of higher learning.
Sioux Center long ago surpassed Orange City in 
sheer business acumen and drive, which is to say, the 
business of hustling; but even today, Orange City, 
the tulip capital of the county with the highest per-
centage of Dutch-Americans of any in the nation, 
remains the only burg whose name is drawn from 
Dutch royalty.
In many fictions about the Dutch Reformed, 
those of us who are so come off as self-righteous 
fusspots too full of our own hot air. To mangle an old 
line from Mencken, we are grim-faced, haunted by 
the fear that “someone, somewhere is having a good 
time.” We’re dour, no-fun-on Sunday workaholics, 
who register zero tolerance for sinners who mow 
their lawns on the Sabbath or jog during church. 
In those novels, insiders have little to do with out-
siders because insiders are unreasonably clannish and 
unwelcoming. Because we have so little to do with 
others, we pick fights with our own in petty quarrels, 
sharp enough to cut each other to shreds if there’s 
even a hint of something unorthodox lingering un-
seen somewhere close. During the fifties, people hid 
television antenna in their attics rather than mount 
them on the roof for all the world to see.
That kind of petulant righteousness is caught in 
brilliant technicolor in The Bells of Helmus, and it’s 
there in spades, which would be, back then, a shock-
ingly worldly usage for someone like me to employ, 
“in spades,” after all, suggesting I play with the duiv-
el’s pretenboek, the Devil’s cards. 
Card-playing is one thing; the seventh com-
mandment begets a whole bigger world of sin and 
repression. No Dutch Reformed writer of the 20th 
century, none at least that I know, has not writ-
ten about the Seventh Commandment. Frederick 
Manfred’s The Secret Place or The Man Who Looked 
Like the Prince of Wales (published under two titles) 
details the sins of a man who was, sadly enough, a 
repeat offender.  In the poem “A Lesson in Rhetoric,” 
Stanley Wiersma (Sietze Buning) tells the tale of an 
upright soul given to crusading for the moral right 
until his own daughter is caught with her pants—
well, you know. Peter DeVries’s many novels indulge 
in Seventh Commandment backsliding with great 
comic appeal. The most important story of my own 
first novel, Home Free, happened in the antecedent 
action of the story and has everything to do with a 
violation of the seventh commandment. 
For reference sometime, pick up a copy of the 
1925 Pulitzer Prize winner, So Big, by Edna Ferber, 
a novel whose setting is east a day’s travel (suburban 
Chicago), but just as critical of Dutch Reformed self-
righteousness as is The Bells of Helmus. 
Why the fuss? Like most staunch protestants, 
Dutch Calvinists have frequently seemed fixated on 
sexual sins. Besides, a violation of the seventh com-
The Bells of Helmus. Cobie de Lespinasse. Portland, Oregon: The Metropolitan Press, 1934. 250 
pp. Reviewed by Dr. James C. Schaap, Emeritus Professor of English, Dordt University.
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mandment, “Thou shalt not commit adultery,” was 
immediately verifiable and therefore often publicly 
disciplined, the only commandment on which the 
church, the real authority in old-line Dutch Reformed 
communities, lowered the righteous boom so openly. 
There were no scarlet letters, but many church people 
my age or older can remember a time when some 
winsome pregnant young woman stood up front in 
the pews to take a score of public licks for love. 
And so it is here in  Bells of Helmus. The heart 
of a plot structure that rotates between protagonist 
characters is a sweet little Dutch maiden in pigtails 
named Jeannie, who, in all innocence (seriously!), 
gets herself pregnant by the doctor’s wonderful son. 
Trust me, there’s not a word about how that almost 
immaculate conception was accomplished; one of the 
unanswered questions of the story is how on earth 
the deed got done. We’re simply to know it did. The 
story suddenly makes clear that Jeannie is pregnant, 
and that, in her time, she delivers a darling little boy, 
out of town of course, but not out of mind.
She’s in Oregon when the precious bundle arrives, 
where she’s being cared for by Helmus’s only medical 
doctor, who got up and left because he simply could 
not handle the insistent militancy of those church bells 
ringing from both sides of Main Street and what those 
bells symbolized. What drives him batty and eventu-
ally out of town for good is the overbearing religiosity 
of the people, demonstrated in a spirituality that grows 
like poison hemlock out of their own manifest boor-
ishness. Besides, it’s his own son who got poor and 
beautiful Jeannie in the family way. 
There are untold prototypes in the novel, espe-
cially if you know the real story of Ms. de Lespinaase’s 
grandfather-in-law, Orange City’s first doctor, a cul-
tured gentleman among other pioneers, a man who 
practiced his brand of humanism via a creed that he’d 
say had only one commandment—to love people, a 
creed that makes the thorny Dutch Reformed pietists 
roll their eyes. Cobie Muyskens de Lespinasse is not 
moving far afield from her own family’s stories.
Strangely enough, quite startlingly in fact, Bells 
of Helmus is a religious novel, suggesting that Cobie 
de Lespinasse was somehow herself as incapable of 
escaping her own religious tradition as the whipping 
she gives Orange City’s mega-religious folks in the 
novel might suggest. The good humanist doctor has 
his own come-to-Jesus moment late in the novel and 
thus gives up his secularism in exchange for a level of 
spirituality he would have disparaged earlier in his 
Orange City sojourn.
It’s a bizarre novel meant to carry fiery arrows 
into the fort Orange City once may have wanted to 
be, standing steadfast against worldliness. But Bells of 
Helmus also insists on rewriting the old creeds. 
If the novel weren’t so much about some of us, I’d 
say, “Don’t waste your time.” But it’s bigger than its 
obvious and sometimes glaring limitations. Today, al-
most 90 years later, it offers more to consider than its 
author ever intended, both about her and about us. 
I don’t think anyone will write an opera based on 
the Bells of Helmus for next year’s Tulip Festival Night 
Show. I’m quite sure it wouldn’t go up.
Bells of Helmus conveys a jaundiced view of what 
it once meant to be Dutch Reformed or Dutch 
Calvinist out in the hinterland, but while I can imag-
ine Ms. de Lespinasse had her own good reasons to 
carpet-bomb her hometown, this particular 73-year-
old reader can’t help but believe she’s not all wrong 
about how things were or may have been.  
A wonderful thing about novels—about books—
is that sometimes they teach you far more than their 
authors may have ever intended. So ’tis with The Bells 
of Helmus.
Guillaume Groen Van Prinsterer, Unbelief and Revolution translated by Harry Van Dyke. 
Bellingham WA: Lexham Press, 2018. ISBN: 978-1-68359228-0, xxxix+267 pp.; also Harry Van 
Dyke, Challenging the Spirit of Modernity: A Study of Groen van Prinsterer’s Unbelief and Revolution. 
Bellingham WA: Lexham Press, 2018. ISBN: 978-1-68359320-1, xxii+345 pp. By Keith C. 
Sewell, Emeritus Professor of History, Dordt University.
These volumes represent new editions of a single 
volume first published in 1989.1 The first is Harry 
Van Dyke’s translation into English of Guillaume 
Groen van Prinsterer’s (hereafter Groen) Ongeloof en 
Revolutie (1847, 1868). This republication of Unbelief 
and Revolution (UR) is a welcome contribution to 
Christian literature in English. Harry Van Dyke is 
a Fellow of the Dooyeweerd Centre for Christian 
Philosophy and Professor Emeritus of History at 
Redeemer University College, Ancaster, Ontario.
When this book was first published, Groen was 
already known in the Netherlands for the early vol-
umes in the Archives ou Correspondance inédite de la 
Maison de l’Orange-Nassau (1835-61) series. Groen’s 
thinking was deeply historical. That said, Unbelief and 
Revolution is not only of historical interest because 
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its central message continues to be deeply relevant to 
the crucial questions that continue to confront the 
West. First delivered as lectures in 1845-6, Unbelief 
and Revolution was published in 1847. The timing 
was remarkable, as violent revolutionary movements 
again afflicted much of Europe the following year.2
The whole work is also an argument based on a 
biblically directed understanding of the human con-
dition and the course of human history. In the initial 
lecture Groen makes clear that he does not identify 
“revolution” simply with changes in governments or 
constitutions. He is not so much concerned with the 
details of the French Revolution, as with its religious 
roots and consequences. Moreover, he is clear that 
those who seek to merely moderate change driven by 
revolutionary unbelief are doomed to failure. 
Groen insisted that “The Revolution doctrine 
is unbelief applied to politics” (UR, 4), and that 
the prime requirement is for Christian believers to 
understand in depth the spiritual character and his-
torical significance of the forces that now confront 
them. Moreover, he stressed that revolutionary de-
velopments in history arise from the formulation and 
advocacy of revolutionary ideas. In the face of such 
challenges, he called upon Christians to not shrink 
from their responsibilities but to be salt and light, 
however oppressive the cultural atmosphere (UR, 
1-10)—wise counsel, also for our times.
In the second and third lectures, Groen empha-
sises how the Revolution flew in the face of past ex-
perience, not least as its proponents exhibited a su-
perficial attitude towards the past itself. That said, he 
does not consider himself to be without allies. For 
example, he speaks highly of the testimony of the 
lawyer, poet, and historian Willem Bilderdijk (1756-
1831). He also draws on the work of Friedrick von 
Gentz (1764-1832), the writer on international rela-
tions (UR, 15-18). Groen also takes note of the writ-
ings of Friedrich Julius Stahl (1802-61), the German 
legal and constitutional scholar (UR, 70-1). He 
makes clear that he does not wholly concur with any 
of these authors. He reserves his highest praise for 
Edmund Burke (1729-97), the Anglo-Irish politician 
and author (UR, 15).
Groen builds his case step by step. In the follow-
ing two lectures he considers the pre-revolutionary 
Christian past. He is clear that the centuries before 
1789 were far from flawless (UR, 44), but insists 
that the Revolution itself was not attributable to 
the shortcomings of the ancient régime (UR, 32-3). 
Nevertheless, the old order did recognise that gover-
nance was of divine institution, it resisted assertions 
that might was right, and it was suspicious of central-
ization (UR, 20-3, 39-40). He was appreciative of the 
“mixed monarchy” (Crown, Lords, and Commons) 
of Great Britain, and the moderation of the 1688 
“Glorious Revolution” (UR, 42-3).3 He asserted that 
the Dutch “restoration” of 1814-15 did not repre-
sent a genuine return to a non-revolutionary outlook 
(UR, 34).
In the fifth lecture, Groen addresses in greater 
depth the question of the abuses that preceded the 
Revolution. He concurred with Burke’s assessment 
that pre-revolutionary France was not beyond or-
derly reformation. As it was, the revolution was not 
initiated by the most oppressed, but by the privileged 
for their own purposes. It was not launched to bring 
about improvements, but to achieve a complete over-
throw of all existing institutions, resulting in a full 
political and social transformation (UR, 45-50, 53). 
Thereafter, Groen transitions in his Sixth lec-
ture to a discussion headed “The Perversion of 
Constitutional Law.” Here we encounter some in-
triguing questions, and we should keep in view the 
reality that words such as “sovereignty,” “rights,” “lib-
erty,” and “liberal” have, over the centuries, acquired 
a wide semantic range. Indeed, this applies also to 
the term “revolution” itself—which might mean a 
restoration or a revolutionary overthrow.4 Groen’s 
concern was that the Calvinistic Reformation itself, 
in the place it awarded to church members in the 
appointment of office-bearers and in the ways its sec-
ond generation called for liberty in the face of per-
secution, may have unwittingly set a course towards 
Revolution. Theodore Beza (1519-1605), François 
Hotman (1524-90), and Philippe du Plessis Mornay 
(1549-1623) eloquently pleaded for toleration in the 
face of cruel persecution. Groen certainly had his 
doubts about these developments (UR, 66-69). That 
said, these writers did not embrace any notion of hu-
man autonomy, as did the revolutionaries of 1789. 
Moreover, while the literature on these writers is im-
portant, the reader needs to be constantly on the alert 
for the possibility that latter-day liberally-minded 
historians might retrospectively impute the revolu-
tionary principles of the 1780s to an earlier period.5
Predictably, Groen then turns to consider the 
Protestant Reformation. Did the Reformation in 
some way open the door to the revolution of 1789? 
This contention has found a place in Catholic his-
toriography.6 In reply, Groen observes that the 
Reformation called for freedom from tradition only 
where tradition contradicted Scripture. At the same 
time, “liberty,” including “freedom of religion,” was 
not the first objective of the Reformation. Indeed, the 
first reformers were deeply submissive to the dynastic 
rulers of the day (UR, 72-75). After the Reformation, 
as dead orthodoxy came to prevail, protestant leaders 
44     Pro Rege—September 2021
its central message continues to be deeply relevant to 
the crucial questions that continue to confront the 
West. First delivered as lectures in 1845-6, Unbelief 
and Revolution was published in 1847. The timing 
was remarkable, as violent revolutionary movements 
again afflicted much of Europe the following year.2
The whole work is also an argument based on a 
biblically directed understanding of the human con-
dition and the course of human history. In the initial 
lecture Groen makes clear that he does not identify 
“revolution” simply with changes in governments or 
constitutions. He is not so much concerned with the 
details of the French Revolution, as with its religious 
roots and consequences. Moreover, he is clear that 
those who seek to merely moderate change driven by 
revolutionary unbelief are doomed to failure. 
Groen insisted that “The Revolution doctrine 
is unbelief applied to politics” (UR, 4), and that 
the prime requirement is for Christian believers to 
understand in depth the spiritual character and his-
torical significance of the forces that now confront 
them. Moreover, he stressed that revolutionary de-
velopments in history arise from the formulation and 
advocacy of revolutionary ideas. In the face of such 
challenges, he called upon Christians to not shrink 
from their responsibilities but to be salt and light, 
however oppressive the cultural atmosphere (UR, 
1-10)—wise counsel, also for our times.
In the second and third lectures, Groen empha-
sises how the Revolution flew in the face of past ex-
perience, not least as its proponents exhibited a su-
perficial attitude towards the past itself. That said, he 
does not consider himself to be without allies. For 
example, he speaks highly of the testimony of the 
lawyer, poet, and historian Willem Bilderdijk (1756-
1831). He also draws on the work of Friedrick von 
Gentz (1764-1832), the writer on international rela-
tions (UR, 15-18). Groen also takes note of the writ-
ings of Friedrich Julius Stahl (1802-61), the German 
legal and constitutional scholar (UR, 70-1). He 
makes clear that he does not wholly concur with any 
of these authors. He reserves his highest praise for 
Edmund Burke (1729-97), the Anglo-Irish politician 
and author (UR, 15).
Groen builds his case step by step. In the follow-
ing two lectures he considers the pre-revolutionary 
Christian past. He is clear that the centuries before 
1789 were far from flawless (UR, 44), but insists 
that the Revolution itself was not attributable to 
the shortcomings of the ancient régime (UR, 32-3). 
Nevertheless, the old order did recognise that gover-
nance was of divine institution, it resisted assertions 
that might was right, and it was suspicious of central-
ization (UR, 20-3, 39-40). He was appreciative of the 
“mixed monarchy” (Crown, Lords, and Commons) 
of Great Britain, and the moderation of the 1688 
“Glorious Revolution” (UR, 42-3).3 He asserted that 
the Dutch “restoration” of 1814-15 did not repre-
sent a genuine return to a non-revolutionary outlook 
(UR, 34).
In the fifth lecture, Groen addresses in greater 
depth the question of the abuses that preceded the 
Revolution. He concurred with Burke’s assessment 
that pre-revolutionary France was not beyond or-
derly reformation. As it was, the revolution was not 
initiated by the most oppressed, but by the privileged 
for their own purposes. It was not launched to bring 
about improvements, but to achieve a complete over-
throw of all existing institutions, resulting in a full 
political and social transformation (UR, 45-50, 53). 
Thereafter, Groen transitions in his Sixth lec-
ture to a discussion headed “The Perversion of 
Constitutional Law.” Here we encounter some in-
triguing questions, and we should keep in view the 
reality that words such as “sovereignty,” “rights,” “lib-
erty,” and “liberal” have, over the centuries, acquired 
a wide semantic range. Indeed, this applies also to 
the term “revolution” itself—which might mean a 
restoration or a revolutionary overthrow.4 Groen’s 
concern was that the Calvinistic Reformation itself, 
in the place it awarded to church members in the 
appointment of office-bearers and in the ways its sec-
ond generation called for liberty in the face of per-
secution, may have unwittingly set a course towards 
Revolution. Theodore Beza (1519-1605), François 
Hotman (1524-90), and Philippe du Plessis Mornay 
(1549-1623) eloquently pleaded for toleration in the 
face of cruel persecution. Groen certainly had his 
doubts about these developments (UR, 66-69). That 
said, these writers did not embrace any notion of hu-
man autonomy, as did the revolutionaries of 1789. 
Moreover, while the literature on these writers is im-
portant, the reader needs to be constantly on the alert 
for the possibility that latter-day liberally-minded 
historians might retrospectively impute the revolu-
tionary principles of the 1780s to an earlier period.5
Predictably, Groen then turns to consider the 
Protestant Reformation. Did the Reformation in 
some way open the door to the revolution of 1789? 
This contention has found a place in Catholic his-
toriography.6 In reply, Groen observes that the 
Reformation called for freedom from tradition only 
where tradition contradicted Scripture. At the same 
time, “liberty,” including “freedom of religion,” was 
not the first objective of the Reformation. Indeed, the 
first reformers were deeply submissive to the dynastic 
rulers of the day (UR, 72-75). After the Reformation, 
as dead orthodoxy came to prevail, protestant leaders 
Pro Rege—September 2021     45 
more radical revolution or counter-revolution (UR, 
109-111). Groen contended that the Revolution 
gave rise to despotic forms of rule in order to con-
tain the anarchy that it had itself generated. It was 
subject to its own inner contradictions. It promised 
“liberty, equality, and fraternity,” but it moved to an 
inversion of its own purported ideals—a despotism 
(or dictatorship) that acknowledged no limits (UR, 
114-129). The only remedy is a return to belief in the 
sovereignty of God in public life (UR, 130-1).
In lectures eleven to fourteen, attention turns to 
the actual course of events in the pre-Revolution, 
the Revolution itself, the “Reign of Terror,” the 
Napoleonic era, and beyond (UR, 135-41). The no-
tion of human autonomy, a key driver of the revo-
lutionary impulse, fermented for a long time prior 
to the 1789 eruption, and once the revolutionary 
process was underway, the “tide of revolution went 
further than anyone had intended at the outset” (UR, 
173-5). The revolution undermined existing legal 
structures and gave rise to a political culture much 
given to mob violence and the coup d’état (UR, 171).
The revolutionaries were typically blind to the 
consequences of their own dogmas. As the revolution-
ary momentum increased, and as each party strove for 
dominance, they were in turn overwhelmed by the 
revolutionary momentum that they sought to direct. 
The result was “the reign of terror” (1793-4), which 
for Groen was the most instructive of all episodes 
(UR, 175), and of whom Maximillian Robespierre 
(1758-94) was the foremost exemplar (UR, 181-6). 
Groen regarded Robespierre as exemplifying in his 
life the teaching and outlook of Rousseau (UR, 194-
7). At this time, as in our own, language itself was 
distorted by revolutionary fervour: the terror was 
imposed in the name of “safety” (UR, 175-8). And 
when it comes to the Committee for Public Safety,8 
Groen insists that even when most horrifying, their 
conduct was the natural  consequence of their con-
viction, the faithful application of the Revolution 
ideas, and by that standard, a commendable utiliza-
tion of revolutionary power (UR, 186).
In short, the Revolution could always find ways 
of justifying its application of revolutionary ideas 
using barbaric methods. Human rights were not 
extended to the opponents of the Revolution itself, 
even as the revolutionaries could be “inhuman for 
love of humanity” (UR, 187-9, also 220).
In his discussion of the period 1794-1845 in the 
fourteenth lecture, Groen states that although the 
terror ended, the Revolution resumed its course. The 
resulting instability produced a succession of con-
stitutions, which provided a façade behind which 
brute force could prevail (UR, 201-5). The result 
often displayed hostility towards the spiritual vitality 
of early evangelicalism (UR, 79-80).
Here Groen makes two assertions. Firstly, the only, 
effective response to revolutionary ideologies is the 
Christian gospel. This is where the centrality of the 
reformed emphasis on preaching the Word of God is 
evident:
The preaching of the gospel is the lever whereby 
world history is made to serve the execution of 
God’s counsel (UR, 81).
These words merit the sustained reflection of all who 
preach the Word of God, and all who reflect on the 
meaning of human history. Secondly, and alongside 
this insight, Groen issues a sobering warning—espe-
cially to those Protestants who have forsaken the faith 
of the Reformation and turned their backs on the 
truth that they previously received. Citing Matthew 
12: 43-45 (“the last state …is worse than the first…
even so shall it be also unto this wicked generation”), 
he points to the deep perils of Protestant apostasy 
(UR, 82). When a culture deliberately turns its 
back on gospel light, the consequences can be very 
dark. As we might expect, Groen concluded that 
the Revolution is not to be laid at the feet of the 
Reformation (UR, 199-200).
In the eighth and ninth lectures, Groen argues 
that the eighteenth century desired the fruits of a 
Christian culture while abandoning the foundational 
doctrines of the faith. It asserted the autonomy of 
man and rejected the sovereignty of God. This phi-
losophy emerged gradually, with deism functioning 
as a kind of half-way-house in the process (UR, 85-
87, 93). In politics, authority became confused with 
absolutism and liberty with lawlessness. He observed 
that the advocates of revolutionary “freedom” were 
often themselves highly intolerant, and that the pro-
motion of popular sovereignty led on to state tyranny 
(UR, 94, 107). For Groen the spirit of unbelief be-
came ever more apparent in the writings of the en-
lightenment philosophers (UR, 89-91). Groen pays 
particular attention to Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-
78), whose influence was extensive (UR, 98-103).7 
In his tenth lecture, Groen develops these themes 
further. The ideologies of Revolution always collide 
with reality; they fail to deliver because in truth they 
cannot meet the deepest needs of mankind. These can 
only be fulfilled in the gospel; but in its fervent asser-
tions of human autonomy, the revolutionary tem-
perament seeks to banish God, but only and inevi-
tably ends up inventing and worshipping substitute 
gods. These fail, and the resulting disappointment, 
or disenchantment, drives men to extremes of even 
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was the military dictatorship of Napoleon Bonaparte 
(1769-1821). Yet even the Napoleonic era (UR, 206-
10) did not see the end of revolutionary policies in 
Europe. The Revolution continued even under the 
forms of the monarchies restored after the devasta-
tion wrought by Napoleon (UR, 212).  
In his concluding fifteenth lecture, Groen ex-
pands upon this theme. The powers of continental 
Europe made the error of resisting the Revolution 
in a revolutionary manner. The one possible excep-
tion was England and the “shrewd men” who gov-
erned her (UR, 223-4). He held the British Prime 
Minister William Pitt the Younger (1759-1806) in 
high regard (UR, 15, 224-5 n. 2).9 Groen feared that 
in post-1814, the Netherlands had become a kind of 
“revolutionary autocracy” (UR, 237). He spoke out 
against the way in which education was controlled by 
this state (UR, 229, 241).
At the same time, Groen was encouraged by 
the partial recovery of Catholicism and Evangelical 
Christianity (UR, 230-2). He is clear that the 
Christian principle is strong enough to confront 
the revolutionary surge, and it is the calling of all 
Christians to uphold that principle (UR, 242-7). In a 
passage that seems powerfully pertinent today, Groen 
asserted that
It may be that without encountering any note-
worthy opposition in the Evangelical religion, 
the radical principle will for a season gain a 
complete victory. It may be that without any 
dangerous tensions or conflicts we are heading 
for a reformation of faith and morals of greater 
scope than in the age of the Reformation. It 
may be—and this seems most probable—that 
we are living in a lull before the storm: that the 
fermentation of all kinds of ideas and the men-
acing posture of warring principles portend the 
coming of a contest between light and darkness 
whose equal has not been seen before in world 
history, either in scope or intensity (UR, 232-3).
Given the spiritual condition of the contempo-
rary West, Groen’s arguments continue to be relevant 
for all Christians seeking to understand and grapple 
with the spirit of our age.
And what of Groen’s interpretation of the French 
Revolution? Has it stood the test of time? Certainly, 
Groen was greatly indebted to Edmund Burke’s 
Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790).10 Burke 
had grasped the centrality of religion for human life 
and already in 1789 understood the Revolution as 
a religious event. Burke influenced many historians, 
such as Herbert Butterfield (1900-79), who wrote 
about the Revolution in strongly anti-revolutionary 
terms.11 Moreover, there have always been thinkers 
ready to offer a critical estimation of the Revolution, 
for example Eric Vögelin (1901-85)12 and Jacob 
Talmon (1916-80).13
The truth is that the Revolution brought forth 
an array of rival ideological standpoints, and that 
these have in turn shaped the historiography of the 
Revolution itself—and ideologies always exhibit 
their particular reductionism and therefore decep-
tively oversimplify the complexities that the histo-
rian confronts. Marxian accounts tended to reduce 
matters to the socio-economic, and therefore could 
not penetrate to the heart of things. In the 1930s 
and 1940s many historians were influenced by the 
Marxian standpoint. Georges Lefebvre (1874-1959) 
offered the most influential Marxian interpretation 
of the French Revolution at this time.14 
However, perceptions shifted, and by the 1960s the 
English historian Alfred Cobban (1901-68) subjected 
the Marxian interpretation to withering criticism.15 In 
France, François Furet (1927-97) led the assault on the 
Marxian interpretation even more decisively.16 Indeed, 
there are significant affinities between the standpoint 
of Furet and the much earlier L’Ancien Régime et la 
Révolution by Alexis de Tocqueville (1805-59).17 By 
the 1980s, the historiographical consensus had settled 
towards the kind of post-revisionist synthesis exhibited 
in the work of William Doyle.18 At the bicentenary 
many historians were ambivalent—embracing liberal-
ism, but wary of the follies and repelled by the excesses 
of the revolution.19
In 1969 Richard Cobb (1917-96) wrote that “de-
spite all the minute analysis of short-term and long-
term causes…there still remains a zone d’ombre of im-
penetrable mystery” about the French Revolution.20 
The truth is that the repudiation of Christianity lay 
at the heart of it all (UR, 94), a point that is hard 
to discern for those who view religion as optional or 
peripheral to human life. Groen penetrated to the 
heart of the Revolution because he first held to bibli-
cal views concerning the centrality of religion and the 
human condition. Moreover, Groen did not rest with 
what we might call a “mere conservatism.” He is su-
premely important because he transcended the limits 
of a purely conservative outlook, thanks to a body 
of insight rooted in the teachings of the Calvinistic 
Reformation and that was both “Christian historical” 
and “Anti-revolutionary.”21
The second book considered here is Challenging 
the Spirit of Modernity: A Study of Groen van Prinsterer’s 
Unbelief and Revolution (CSM). This volume is a valu-
able handbook to UR, providing the reader with con-
textualising information that bridges the gap between 
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was the military dictatorship of Napoleon Bonaparte 
(1769-1821). Yet even the Napoleonic era (UR, 206-
10) did not see the end of revolutionary policies in 
Europe. The Revolution continued even under the 
forms of the monarchies restored after the devasta-
tion wrought by Napoleon (UR, 212).  
In his concluding fifteenth lecture, Groen ex-
pands upon this theme. The powers of continental 
Europe made the error of resisting the Revolution 
in a revolutionary manner. The one possible excep-
tion was England and the “shrewd men” who gov-
erned her (UR, 223-4). He held the British Prime 
Minister William Pitt the Younger (1759-1806) in 
high regard (UR, 15, 224-5 n. 2).9 Groen feared that 
in post-1814, the Netherlands had become a kind of 
“revolutionary autocracy” (UR, 237). He spoke out 
against the way in which education was controlled by 
this state (UR, 229, 241).
At the same time, Groen was encouraged by 
the partial recovery of Catholicism and Evangelical 
Christianity (UR, 230-2). He is clear that the 
Christian principle is strong enough to confront 
the revolutionary surge, and it is the calling of all 
Christians to uphold that principle (UR, 242-7). In a 
passage that seems powerfully pertinent today, Groen 
asserted that
It may be that without encountering any note-
worthy opposition in the Evangelical religion, 
the radical principle will for a season gain a 
complete victory. It may be that without any 
dangerous tensions or conflicts we are heading 
for a reformation of faith and morals of greater 
scope than in the age of the Reformation. It 
may be—and this seems most probable—that 
we are living in a lull before the storm: that the 
fermentation of all kinds of ideas and the men-
acing posture of warring principles portend the 
coming of a contest between light and darkness 
whose equal has not been seen before in world 
history, either in scope or intensity (UR, 232-3).
Given the spiritual condition of the contempo-
rary West, Groen’s arguments continue to be relevant 
for all Christians seeking to understand and grapple 
with the spirit of our age.
And what of Groen’s interpretation of the French 
Revolution? Has it stood the test of time? Certainly, 
Groen was greatly indebted to Edmund Burke’s 
Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790).10 Burke 
had grasped the centrality of religion for human life 
and already in 1789 understood the Revolution as 
a religious event. Burke influenced many historians, 
such as Herbert Butterfield (1900-79), who wrote 
about the Revolution in strongly anti-revolutionary 
terms.11 Moreover, there have always been thinkers 
ready to offer a critical estimation of the Revolution, 
for example Eric Vögelin (1901-85)12 and Jacob 
Talmon (1916-80).13
The truth is that the Revolution brought forth 
an array of rival ideological standpoints, and that 
these have in turn shaped the historiography of the 
Revolution itself—and ideologies always exhibit 
their particular reductionism and therefore decep-
tively oversimplify the complexities that the histo-
rian confronts. Marxian accounts tended to reduce 
matters to the socio-economic, and therefore could 
not penetrate to the heart of things. In the 1930s 
and 1940s many historians were influenced by the 
Marxian standpoint. Georges Lefebvre (1874-1959) 
offered the most influential Marxian interpretation 
of the French Revolution at this time.14 
However, perceptions shifted, and by the 1960s the 
English historian Alfred Cobban (1901-68) subjected 
the Marxian interpretation to withering criticism.15 In 
France, François Furet (1927-97) led the assault on the 
Marxian interpretation even more decisively.16 Indeed, 
there are significant affinities between the standpoint 
of Furet and the much earlier L’Ancien Régime et la 
Révolution by Alexis de Tocqueville (1805-59).17 By 
the 1980s, the historiographical consensus had settled 
towards the kind of post-revisionist synthesis exhibited 
in the work of William Doyle.18 At the bicentenary 
many historians were ambivalent—embracing liberal-
ism, but wary of the follies and repelled by the excesses 
of the revolution.19
In 1969 Richard Cobb (1917-96) wrote that “de-
spite all the minute analysis of short-term and long-
term causes…there still remains a zone d’ombre of im-
penetrable mystery” about the French Revolution.20 
The truth is that the repudiation of Christianity lay 
at the heart of it all (UR, 94), a point that is hard 
to discern for those who view religion as optional or 
peripheral to human life. Groen penetrated to the 
heart of the Revolution because he first held to bibli-
cal views concerning the centrality of religion and the 
human condition. Moreover, Groen did not rest with 
what we might call a “mere conservatism.” He is su-
premely important because he transcended the limits 
of a purely conservative outlook, thanks to a body 
of insight rooted in the teachings of the Calvinistic 
Reformation and that was both “Christian historical” 
and “Anti-revolutionary.”21
The second book considered here is Challenging 
the Spirit of Modernity: A Study of Groen van Prinsterer’s 
Unbelief and Revolution (CSM). This volume is a valu-
able handbook to UR, providing the reader with con-
textualising information that bridges the gap between 
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Groen’s time and our own. Groen’s life and work are 
comprehensively described (CSM, 1-100). An over-
view of Unbelief and Revolution is provided (CSM, 
183-96); the sources, style and audience of the lectures 
are comprehensively discussed (CSM, 128-182); and 
the editions of 1847 and 1868 are compared (CSM, 
197-239). It is possible that at some points, contem-
porary readers of UR will find themselves responding 
to Groen with a “yes, but.” While Groen gets to the 
heart of the Revolution, he does not always do so in 
a way that would necessarily line up with the disci-
plinary techniques and procedures of present-day his-
torians. In a valuable section, Van Dyke responds to 
a range of questions, including Groen’s monarchism 
(CSM, 253-61), and a range of methodological and 
philosophical questions (CSM, 261-318).
These volumes deserve a wide readership. They 
are both stimulating and suggestive. For me the fol-
lowing points emerge: Firstly, while all historians are 
wary of counter-factual speculation, such alternative 
“what might have been” scenarios do serve to height-
en our awareness of the crucial nature of what actu-
ally did happen.22 For example, the fact that France 
as a nation did not embrace the Calvinistic reforma-
tion must be considered as decisive for French, and 
all European history. The France that eventually fell 
into revolutionary courses was the France that had 
already repudiated the Reformation. The negative 
consequences were immense.23
Secondly, Groen (UR, 49, 135, 233) and Van 
Dyke (129, 302-3) both mention the 1780s Patriot 
movement in the Netherlands. These Dutch Patriots 
of protestant background strongly influenced the 
revolutionaries of Paris.24 Sometimes the enemies of 
the gospel are closer to hand than its faithful servants 
realize. Moreover, we should not forget Rousseau’s 
close connection with Geneva.25 We need a discern-
ing English-language treatment of the revolutionary 
movement in the Netherlands of the 1780s, written 
from an authentically anti-revolutionary standpoint. 
Finally, as Van Dyke states, it was Burke who 
“caused the scales to fall from Groen’s eyes.” Groen 
quotes Burke at the crucial points in his argument 
(CSM, 152-4, cf. UR, 15, 42-3, 49, 88, 94, 134, 165). 
It is pertinent that Abraham Kuyper (1837-1920) 
declared, “Edmund Burke was an Anti-revolutionary 
through and through,” and proclaimed, “We Dutch 
Calvinists want to be like Burke.”26 Burke was not a 
hardened conservative—he was in fact a Whig. His 
long-term influence helped preserve Great Britain 
from revolution and in the longer run turned an em-
pire into a commonwealth. He deserves to receive 
much more attention from Christian historians and 
Christians generally. 
Meanwhile, these volumes are strongly recom-
mended for their historical and contemporary rel-
evance.
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